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exclude any scenario, but forces  the legislator to 
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of the principles  of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
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cle. Does  the Region make full use of its  capacity 
for cohesion and coordination? Is  the municipal 
institution organised in the most efficient way? 
Have all of the methods  for dialogue and synergy 
been mobilised? Should inter-municipal collabora-
tions  not be revised in view of improving the quality 
of service at a lower cost? This reflection opens  the 
way to rationalising the organisation of institutions 
and promoting the methods of cooperation.
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1. In Brussels, does the 'big city' project take place via  the suppres-
sion of municipalities  and the drastic reduction in their powers? Some 
people think so, and consider that the characteristics  specific to the 
Brussels  Region1  – including its cramped territory – justify a specific 
institutional organisation. The specific difficulties  which it faces  may only 
be overcome by decompartmentalising the preserve of 'municipalists', 
confined to a  NIMBY-type view ('not in my backyard') and overrepre-
sented in the regional parliament. The 'municipalists' criticise the sup-
porters  of 'everything for the Region' for painting a slanted picture of 
the Region's  relationships with the municipalities  and for depreciating 
the institution and municipal action in order to justify, once and for all, 
the regionalisation of municipal powers  and their gradual effacement, in 
line with the TINA approach ('there is no alternative'). And when the 
latter feel that there are too many municipalities  on the cramped re-
gional territory, the former reply that they are more densely populated 
than the average Walloon and Flemish municipalities. 
2. Neither these controversies nor the difficulties  which mark the rela-
tionships  between the Region and the municipalities  must hide the fact 
that the Belgian Constitution and the Charter of Local Self-Government 
of the Council of Europe2 impose a legal framework for reflection. We 
shall present the thesis  according to which this  framework provides  an 
additional means of structuring the debate, allowing this  aspect of the 
rationalisation of Brussels institutions to evolve. 
3. The aim is not to propose a turnkey institutional model, particularly 
since the subject allows  endless  possibilities  in terms of solutions. In-
stead, the aim is simply to review this framework and to point out its 
imprecisions  – as  seen in the differences between the Constitutional 
Court and the Council of State – in order to propose a framework for 
reflection, excluding the community dimension of the issue. This  in-
volves  (re)considering the organisation of powers in the current institu-
tional framework, without modifying the Constitution or the laws which 
structure Belgian federalism. Suggestions  are made in order to illustrate 
the viewpoints  and to highlight the possibility for in-depth thought be-
tween the two poles. The thought is centred on the organisation of 
powers  between the Region and the municipalities. We do not consider 
the evolution of community (education, etc.)  or federal (police, etc.) 
powers in Brussels.
4. The reflection is structured into three parts.3
1. In the first part, we shall see that in terms  of the distribution of 
power, the law does not favour a particular model and in principle 
does not exclude any scenario, but determines  a procedure. The 
analysis  reveals  the special attention to reserve for municipal self-
government and, through it, the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, which require the local level to be considered as  the 
level of principle for the allocation of powers. The higher authority 
which intends  to take them away has  to justify the increased 
efficiency (subsidiarity) and the extent (proportionality) of this 
restriction. Neither the constitution nor the charter prevent the 
regionalisation of municipal powers, but they prescribe motivation 
based on concrete analysis for each transfer considered.
2. This  argumentative approach requires an explicitation of the 
assets  and shortcomings of each level of power, which are briefly 
outlined in the second part.
3. The third part questions  the possibility of synergetic cooperation 
between the Region and the municipalities  in terms  of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality, guided by four questions. Does 
the Region make full use of its  capacity for cohesion and 
1
1 The term 'Region' refers to the regional institution. We use the term 'region' with a lower-case letter in the common sense of the word.
2 May be consulted on the website of the congress of local and regional authorities: http://www.coe.int/t/congress/Texts/conventions/charte_autonomie_fr.asp
3These parts are based on the analysis of legal and parliamentary documents, as well as on conversations with various representatives, such as Bernard Clerfayt, mayor of Schaerbeek and 
federal deputy, and Patrick van Ypersele, current member of the Cellule stratégique du Secrétaire d'Etat aux Réformes institutionnelles Melchior Wathelet. The ideas developed reflect those 
of the author only. 
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coordination? Is  the municipal institution organised in the most 
efficient way? Have all of the methods for dialogue and synergy 
been mobilised? Should inter-municipal collaborations not be 
revised in view of improving the quality of service at a lower cost? 
The first two questions  concern the organisation and functioning of 
institutions  as  well as  their potential for evolution, and the last two 
concern the field of possible synergies. This  reflection opens the 
way to rationalising the organisation of institutions and promoting 
the methods of cooperation.
1. The legal framework: municipal self-government requires an 
argumentative approach based on the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality
5. Apart from a few powers which come under the jurisdiction of the 
federal authority, the Region organises  the municipal institutions. It can 
make changes to their size and their powers. It organises  and exercises 
supervision. However, the Region is not free to do what it wants: it can-
not ignore the principle of municipal self-government. We shall review 
its scope as well as three restrictions.
1.1. Powers in principle and cross-curricular competency
6. Municipal self-government covers three dimensions.
1. The Constitution (art. 41) and the special and ordinary laws 
define it generally: the power of municipalities covers matters  which 
concern municipal interests. 'The principle of local self-government 
presupposes that local authorities are able to seize any object which 
they consider to be in their interest, and to regulate as they feel 
appropriate.'4 The Charter of Local Self-Government (art. 3) defines 
it in a  similar way as: 'the right and the ability of local authorities, 
within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial 
share of public affairs  under their own responsibility and in the 
interests of the local population.  This right shall be exercised by 
councils or assemblies  composed of members freely elected by 
secret ballot on the basis  of direct, equal, universal suffrage, and 
which may possess executive organs  responsible to them'. The 
municipalities  may intervene in a 'cross-curricular' manner in powers 
which come under the higher levels  of authority if these policies  are 
in the municipal interest. The higher levels  of authority must then 
allow the municipalities to exercise their powers.
2. The decentralised authorities  have primary power of 
characterisation for matters  of local interest, as  well as a high level 
of autonomy in terms  of organisation and management (including 
the right to cooperate and associate, as  well as  financial capacities 
and autonomy).
3. Finally, municipal self-government follows  a rule regarding the 
allocation of power. The local level is  granted its  own powers, and is 
thus  not limited to being a mere agent of the higher authorities. It 
even acts  as the level of allocation of powers  in principle, unless  a 
higher level of authority demonstrates  a greater capacity to manage 
these policies: '3. Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, 
in preference, by those authorities  which are closest to the citizen. 
Allocation of responsibility to another authority should weigh up the 
extent and nature of the task and requirements  of efficiency and 
economy. 4. Powers given to local authorities  shall normally be full 
and exclusive. They may not be undermined or limited by another, 
central or regional, authority except as  provided for by the law. 5. 
Where powers  are delegated to them by a central or regional 
authority, local authorities  shall, insofar as possible, be allowed 
discretion in adapting their exercise to local conditions.' [...]' (art. 4 
of the Charter). 
7. The Additional Protocol to the Charter on the right to participate in 
the affairs  of the local authorities, signed by the Belgian state, shares 
the same ambition to favour grassroots democracy.
8. In terms of transfer of powers, the Charter sets no obligations  or 
requirements, apart from an argumentative approach based on a con-
crete analysis  for each power considered and not in a  general manner. 
2
4 Constitutional Court, judgment n° 89/2010.
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For example, in a given matter, can the Region prove more coordination 
and harmonisation and, if so, is  it justified that it invests  all of the mat-
ter? In other words, any undermining of municipal self-government 
must be motivated by the enacting authority based on the principle of 
subsidiarity, in accordance with which it must justify the validity of its  
intervention ('what is the increase in efficiency?'). If the higher authority 
meets  this  requirement, it must comply with the criterion of proportion-
ality by limiting its action to the measure needed to reach the objective 
('how and to what extent?').
9. Does  the reasoning apply to the merging of the nineteen munici-
palities  into one, in the case of the formation of a city-region? It is  true 
that foreign cities which have been granted regional status, with more 
than one million inhabitants, sometimes  take advantage of the preroga-
tives  of local self-government. The Charter of Local Self-Government 
does not consider this  hypothesis  formally, except to specify that 
‘Changes in local authority boundaries shall not be made without prior 
consultation of the local communities  concerned, possibly by means of 
a referendum where this  is  permitted by statute’ (art. 5). The fact re-
mains  that the situation in Brussels is  characterised by the existence of 
nineteen municipalities  and that municipal interest is  defined based on 
this. It is  therefore in terms of this  situation that the effects  of any 
changes  are assessed. The models of demerging or merging of mu-
nicipalities  are aimed at the undermining of the municipal institution to 
the benefit of a  more regional management. If  the legislator were to 
take this route, it would not be able to escape the argumentative ap-
proach.
10. The European Charter of Local Self-Government does  not estab-
lish an institutional supervisory body for the principles  which it guaran-
tees, after the example of the European Court of Human Rights insti-
tuted by the European Convention on Human Rights. The text (art. 11) 
makes  the states  responsible for organising an appeal. The national 
jurisdictions  – in particular the Constitutional Court – verifies  the legis-
lator’s compliance with regional orders. The Congress of Local and Re-
gional Authorities  of Europe (CLRAE), the Council of Europe representa-
tive body for local authorities, organises  political control and establishes 
regular reports. Its  recommendations, resolutions  and interpretations 
constitute useful reference points  in the concrete application of the 
principle of municipal self-government.
1.2. Two restrictions: Hierarchy of norms and action of the higher 
authority in the framework of ITS powers
11. The first restriction on municipal self-government is  linked to the 
fact that a power must be exercised in compliance with the hierarchy of 
norms. If the federal state, a Community or a Region adopts  a regula-
tion, the local authorities  submit to it. Legislative action limits the self-
government of municipalities, which may only address a matter in 
compliance with and as a supplement to the related legislation.
12. The second restriction results  from the action of legislators, which 
may also deliberately restrict local self-government in the framework of 
their powers. They have not failed to use this  authority, either to have 
power exercised at a higher level (government, public interest bodies, 
etc.) and therefore to forbid municipalities  from exercising it, or to or-
ganise it in a  more or less  restricting manner and to entrust all or part of 
its implementation to the municipalities. 
13. However, the area of municipal self-government cannot be defined 
in an exhaustive list. 'The Region would not be able to prevent the 
provinces [or the municipalities: author’s  note] – via the adoption of an 
organic law – from regulating anything of provincial [or municipal: 
author’s note] interest, for example, by establishing a closed list of mat-
ters which these institutions  would be authorised to regulate, or by pro-
viding its  own peremptory definition of local interest.5 The Constitutional 
Court considers that the undermining of local self-government would 
3
5 Announcement of the legislation section of the Council of State of 18 September 2003 on the draft which became a decree establishing the Walloon provinces (parliamentary document, 
Walloon Parliament, n° 613/1-2003/2004, p. 48).
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be contrary to municipal interest, 'if it was evidently disproportionate'.6 
'This  would be the case, for example, if it ended up depriving the mu-
nicipalities  of all or most of their powers, or if the limitation of power 
could not be justified by the fact that it would be managed better at 
another level of authority'.7
14. In practice, these considerations  result in diverging assessments, 
in particular between the Constitutional Court and the legislation sec-
tion of the Council of State. The criterion of subsidiarity and the pa-
rameter of efficiency call on factual elements  of assessment, which 
leave room for subjectivity. But the divergence originates  elsewhere. 
The Constitutional Court confines  itself to the minor control of the con-
ditions for restricting municipal self-government. It limits  this control to 
the examination of the 'evidently disproportionate' character of legisla-
tive intervention. To do so, it bases  its  analysis on preliminary works 
only, i.e. considerations of a political nature put forward by the author of 
the norm, regardless  of their veracity or the true implications of the 
measure. It does  not consider possible measures  which are less  detri-
mental to municipal self-government. Furthermore, the Court is exempt 
from any formal reference to the Charter of Local Self-Government and 
to the argumentative approaches  advocated by the latter. The reason-
ing of the Council of State, however, is  in keeping with this  approach. It 
refers  to the Charter and endeavours  to assess  the concrete effects of 
the legislative bills on municipal self-government. It points  out that the 
legislator must 'duly justify' all restrictions  and 'demonstrate concretely' 
the pertinence of each of them. The approach of the Council of State is 
anchored in practice and its detailed motivation often appears  more 
critical with respect to the repeated attempts on behalf of the regional 
legislator to progressively reduce local self-government.
15. In the framework of the appeal against the order of 22 January 
2009 regarding the parking policy and the creation of the Parking 
Agency of the Brussels-Capital Region, the Constitutional Court ruled 
that the Region had the power to adopt the disputed order, despite the 
fact that municipal roads are a matter of municipal interest. With refer-
ence to the motives  presented, it considered that 'Failing intervention 
on behalf of the Region, there would still be problems  such as the inex-
plicable differences  in regulation between municipalities, the transfer of 
parking from one municipality to another or the inequitable character of 
parking cards  granted to residents  in close proximity to the territorial 
boundaries between municipalities. Furthermore, it would not be possi-
ble to reach the objectives related to reducing traffic and managing it in 
a better way.' Basing itself on the Charter, the Council of State deemed 
that the text undermined municipal self-government in a disproportion-
ate manner as  the objective could be reached via other means, in par-
ticular by opting for a mechanism of voluntary compliance of munici-
palities with the proposed system.8
16. Following this comparative analysis, the question may be asked as 
to whether the Court takes  away some of the effectiveness  of judicial 
remedy prescribed by the Charter by exercising only marginal control of 
local self-government.
1.3. Third restriction: levy taxes and impose tariffs
17. Municipalities  have the power to levy taxes as  well as certain tar-
iffs. The Region may limit this  power, according to conditions  which 
vary in relation to the nature of the contribution. Let us therefore make a 
brief review of its characteristics.
1.3.1. The distinction between tax and tariff
18. Tax is defined as  'a levy practised through the authority of the 
state, [the Regions: author’s note], the provinces  or the municipalities 
on the income earned by people – governed by either public or private 
law – non legal entities and de facto associations  or communities, 
which exist on their territory or have interests  there, in  order to be allo-
4
6 Constitutional Court, judgment n° 7/2009
7 Constitutional Court, judgment n° 89/2010.
8 Council of State, announcement n° 44.315/4, parliamentary document, Brussels Regional Parliament, n° A-498/1 – 2007/2008, p. 67.
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cated to public utility services'.9  In accordance with the principle of 
consenting to be taxed, it is  the responsibility of the municipal council 
to set down the principle of collection and decide on the calculation 
method. The rules regarding taxes appear in municipal regulations, but 
the authorisation to levy taxes is  voted each year. Taxes  are essentially 
used as a contribution to collective expenditure, as  well as having an 
incentive or dissuasive function. They never represent a  compensation 
for a specific service provided to a person liable for payment.
19. A payment (tariff) is a contribution of a  non fiscal character. It is 
defined as  'the compensation for a service provided by the authority to 
the benefit of the person liable for payment considered individually. It is 
nothing but a compensation, requiring a reasonable relationship be-
tween the cost or the value of the service provided and the amount due 
by the person liable for payment. As  the tariff is the compensation for a 
public service, it is  associated with  the competence in relation to the 
subject matter of the authority concerned'.10 The tariff cannot consist of 
a service related to obligations  of the authority in terms  of public secu-
rity and peace or access to part of a public road. The authority is  re-
quired to propose an 'added value'. For example, the installation of 
ticket machines and parking ticket control in the framework of a general 
mobility policy are considered to be special services. The legal status  of 
tariffs  is  more flexible than that of taxes: tariffs  cannot be voted each 
year and the law or regulation must not define the essential elements.
1.3.2. The authority of municipalities to levy taxes
20. Municipalities  are free to tax all people who live in the municipality, 
as well as all the people who have interests there based on all of the 
situations  which exist in the municipality or on all of the events  which 
take place there, even if this  levying has  consequences  on the behav-
iour of citizens with respect to subject-matter competence which is  not 
under the remit of municipalities. 
21. Although the Region has been given the power to set rules  relating 
to the establishment and collection of municipal taxes, in principle it 
does not have the power to adopt a regulation which restricts  the 
power of municipalities  to introduce a  tax. This power belongs  to the 
federal legislator. Autonomy as  regards  municipal tax is  still an obstacle, 
in such a way that the administration establishes  general tax rates  or 
rates for property tax additions via circular.
22. There is, however, one exception. Based on implicit competence, 
the Region may restrict the municipal tax capacity if it justifies  a  con-
nection with one of its powers, if this  encroachment upon federal power 
is  necessary in order for it to exercise one of its  powers, if the matter is 
part of a differentiated regime and if the effect of the provisions at issue 
on this  matter remains  marginal. This form of occasional 'interference' 
may only be used sparingly and on a  case-by-case basis, as  it involves 
not only encroaching upon a federal reserved power (art. 170 of the 
Constitution) but also involves limiting municipal self-government. The 
measure also undermines  municipal tax collection and therefore ap-
pears to affect its actual capacity to exercise its  powers (art. 41 of the 
Constitution and art. 9 of the Charter).11
23. The Brussels  Region called upon implicit competence to adopt the 
order of 22 January 2009 on the organisation of the abovementioned 
parking policy. The Constitutional Court ruled that the Region was 
founded in order to restrict – and even thwart – the power of munici-
palities  to establish a parking tax based on its  power to manage public 
roads, establish their legal status  and, if  need be, regulate the private 
use of public roads.12 Among other motives, the Court considers  that 
5
9 Court of Cassation, 20 March 2003.
10 Constitutional Court, judgment n° 89/2010.
11Council of State, announcement on the draft which became a decree of 21 March 2002 establishing the partnership and the general financing of Walloon provinces, parliamentary 
document, Parliament of the Walloon Region, n° 317/1 – 2001-2002, p. 10.
12Constitutional Court, judgment n° 89/2010 (B.9 to B.13.2).
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'parking regulation may therefore constitute a necessary measure for 
the Brussels regional legislator in order to exercise its  power as regards 
public road management and to reach its  objectives, considering the 
special situation of the Region’s nineteen municipalities'.13
1.3.3. The power of municipalities to levy tariffs
24. As long as  it proves  a connection with its  powers, the Region may 
forbid the municipalities  from collecting tariffs. Contrary to the applica-
ble tax regime, there are no clauses  which reserve this  power to the 
federal legislator. In the framework of the appeal against the order on 
the organisation of the parking policy, the constitutional judicial authority 
considered that the Region had the power to prevent the municipalities 
from continuing to collect tariffs  adopted in the framework of road traffic 
complementary regulations and to substitute it with a regional tariff. In 
doing so, the Court based itself on regional power as  regards  the man-
agement and establishment of the legal status of the road system.
2. Respective assets and shortcomings: background information 
about the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
25. In the current legal framework, the higher authority must prove that 
a limitation of local self-government is justified due to the nature and 
extent of the task, meets the criterion of efficiency and allows  an econ-
omy of scale to be achieved. This  involves giving details  of the assets 
and shortcomings  of municipalities and the Region. 'Regionalists' and 
'municipalists' assess these differently.14 Any attempt to make a list of 
them is  therefore subject to criticism on both sides. Nevertheless, let us 
attempt an outline in order to demonstrate the relevance of considering 
them according to the proposed legal and argumentative framework.  
2.1. The municipalities
26. Which elements  should be considered assets  or shortcomings  of 
the municipalities in terms of efficiency and economy of scale?
2.1.1. Proximity and democratic representativeness
27. The European Charter of Local Self-Government underlines  the 
fact that the local authorities ‘are closest to the citizen and give him the 
opportunity of participating effectively in the making of decisions affect-
ing his  everyday environment’.15  Proximity does not mean that each 
citizen knows  the municipal representatives  personally or approaches 
them at every turn. This  concept refers to three realities  in the context 
of Brussels.
1. Firstly, it refers  to the democratic legitimacy of local 
representatives. Because they have been elected, municipal 
councillors are first-line representatives.16
2. Secondly, participation organised by the public authorities 
(neighbourhood and shopkeeper committee meetings, questions  of 
inhabitants  during municipal council meetings, etc.) is  much easier 
to implement at municipal level.17 The experience in Antwerp shows 
that beyond a certain size there is  a clear need for proximity. 
Although distance does not formally affect the representativeness of 
elected officials assigned by direct elections, it affects its perception. 
3. Finally, proximity has an 'operational' dimension. The chain of 
operations  in municipal administration is shorter. Information moves 
upwards more quickly. Furthermore, due to their limited territory, 
6
13Constitutional Court, judgment n° 89/2010 (B.13.1). Contra: voy. C.E., announcement n° 44.315/4, op. cit.
14 The long version of the analysis is made available by the author for download (in French only). It explores a downstream reflection on the correlative legal obstacles to the reduction of the 
municipal institution to its simplest form. 
15Explanatory report of the European Charter of Local Self-Government.
16See the preamble of the Charter of Local Self-Government and Council of State, announcement of 22 October 1980 on various bills aimed at granting foreigners the right to vote at 
municipal level, annexed to the draft law sanctioning the Treaty on the European Union, parliamentary document, House, 482/1-91/92, p. 84.
17Additional Protocol to the European Charter of Local Self-Government on the right to participate in the affairs of the local authorities.
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municipalities  enjoy better proximity in terms  of locations, users  and 
partners  (shopkeepers’ and residents’ associations, etc.), which 
allows  actions  to be carried out with the territory taken well into 
consideration. Municipalities  therefore play a role of two-way 
intercessor. As  they are more approachable, the members  of the 
college are the permanent targets  of the expectations and 
reproaches of citizens, including those relating to regional powers. 
Furthermore, municipal authorities  are more familiar than their 
citizens  to the many regional stakeholders. Their intercession is 
useful in guiding stakeholders  through the mysteries  of 
administration and the complexity of procedures, thus  avoiding 
frustrations and resentment.
28. Seen in this  way, the local work of municipalities  is  valuable to the 
Region. But practice can prove this  vision wrong. Proximity serves as a 
pretext for certain vague desires  to escape the regional project. It also 
favours the appropriation of the democratic process  by a small number 
of stakeholders, mainly in the presence of structured pressure groups. 
Finally, in a  context of proximity – without it being a specificity of the 
municipal level – elected representatives  and voters  may make mutual 
use of each other in a 'clientelist' relationship. 
2.1.2. The municipality: executive body and consolidator of scattered 
powers
29. The definition of municipal powers according to local interest al-
lows  municipalities to manage cross-cutting policies. Their interventions 
are not confined to the area of regional powers. 'Unlike the regime ap-
plicable to the communities  and the regions, whose powers  are exclu-
sive in principle with respect to the federal authority and to each other, 
the recognition of the powers  of municipalities  and provinces  based on 
their self-government relies  on a system which does not exclude – and 
often involves – a sharing of powers between the higher authority and 
the decentralised authorities  or a collaboration between these 
authorities.'18
30. Municipalities  are therefore places where scattered powers  are 
consolidated, particularly in Brussels. For example, in terms  of security 
in public spaces, municipalities combine the authority of the police, Be-
liris, security contracts  and urban policy – under federal jurisdiction – 
with regional neighbourhood contracts  and even European grants 
(ERDF, ESF).
31. Due to this cross-cutting aspect, the disappearance of the mu-
nicipal level would force the Region as well as the Communities and the 
federal authority to reconsider the organisation of some of their powers 
(police, cultural centres, education, etc.).
2.1.3. Cost
32. Contrary to preconceived notions,19  a quantitative analysis  com-
paring big cities  [Verdonck & al., 2011] shows that the municipalities of 
Brussels  are not more extravagant than the other urban municipalities 
in Belgium, especially considering the fact that the latter may transfer 
some of their powers to the provinces or to the increasing number of 
inter-municipal companies.20  The study also shows  that, in Brussels, 
the regionalisation of certain powers exercised elsewhere at local level, 
such as rubbish collection, does not necessarily generate an economy 
of scale. In the same way, when considered globally, the figures 21 relat-
ing to police supervision – whose costs and efficiency are managed by 
7
18Council of State, announcement of 15 February 2007 on a special bill modifying article 1 of the special law of 6 January 1989 on the Court of Arbitration, in view of empowering the Court 
to monitor conformance with articles 41 and 162 of the Constitution as regards the municipal and provincial autonomy, parliamentary document, Senate, 3-1054/2, 2006-2007, p. 4.
19 J. De Wit, 'Het veiligheidsprobleem in Brussel' in Gazet van Antwerpen of 5 February 2010, http://gva.be/dekrant/experts/johndewit/het-veiligheidsprobleem-in-brussel.aspx.
20  M. Verdonck, N. Van Droogenbroeck, M. Taymans, 'Are the municipalities of Brussels guilty of wasteful spending? A comparative analysis of the budgets of Belgium’s main urban 
municipalities', in Brussels Studies, n° 49, 9 May 2011, www.brusselsstudies.be.
21We have used figures from the study conducted by Bernard Clerfayt (cfr Perspectives francophones, n° 64, 15 February-15 March 2011, pp. 8 and 9).
Nicolas LAGASSE, 
« Organisation of powers between Region and municipalities in Brussels: 
going beyond the antagonism of the 'Tina' and 'Nimby' approaches », 
Brussels Studies, Number 61, September 24th 2012,
 www.brusselsstudies.be
the six police areas in Brussels 22 – are equal to those of the police in 
Antwerp, Ghent, Liège and Charleroi, which are constituted by a single 
municipal area.
2.2. The Region
33. The two main assets of the Region are coherence and solidarity.
2.2.1. Coherence
34. The Region gives  coherence to largescale policies: the emergence 
of regional interest is  likely to transcend local or individual interests. 
Thus said, sometimes it does  not exercise its  powers  and its coordina-
tion role. Two factors  hinder this  objective of coherence. Contrary to the 
municipality, the Region has exclusive competence only and has diffi-
culty playing the role of integrator. Furthermore, the coherence of the 
Region’s  policies suffers  because of its  administrative and sectoral divi-
sion between cabinets, ministries and para-regional authorities.
2.2.2. Solidarity
35. The policies  for solidarity between citizens  and municipalities  are 
created more easily at the level of the Region, which allows inequalities 
to be made up for on a larger scale through the fair distribution of 
means or through adjustment mechanisms. Better than groupings  or 
municipal reconstitutions, the general grant for municipalities or the re-
gional financing of neighbourhood contracts allow solidarity to be es-
tablished between citizens  and the region’s socioeconomic disparities 
to be taken into account. In the same way, the financing of supra-local 
public infrastructures  (sports  centres, swimming pools,23  etc.)  is  more 
equitable than municipal investments, a part of which benefits the citi-
zens of other municipalities.
36. In practice, the effectiveness  of this  solidarity depends on the cho-
sen intervention or adjustment criteria. The general grant for municipali-
ties fills this function if its allocation criteria are determined objectively.
3.  Framework for reflection regarding better use of powers, ra-
tionalisation of structures and the development of synergies
37. For each power, the argumentative approach imposed by the 
principle of local self-government involves abandoning an a priori ap-
proach and adopting an empirical approach: it involves viewing institu-
tions  in terms  of their internal organisation and synergies before con-
sidering transfers  of powers. We shall illustrate this  reasoning with a few 
examples centred on four themes: a better organisation of the Region 
(3.1); a  better organisation of the municipalities  (3.2); a better organisa-
tion of the relationship between the municipalities and the Region (3.3); 
a better organisation of the relationship between the municipalities 
(3.4). 
3.1.  A better organisation of the Region
38. Rationalisations may be considered at regional level, in order to 
ensure better coordination of stakeholders  by limiting redundant admin-
istrative structures. This  redundancy is  explained by the concern for 
political and/or linguistic balance, through the distribution of influence 
among bodies dependent on different ministers. Let us  look at a few 
examples in the areas of public or subsidised housing, economic poli-
cies and mobility.
39. The Société du Logement de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale 
(SLRB, Brussels-Capital Region Housing Society), the Société de 
Développement pour la  Région de Bruxelles-Capitale (SDRB, Brussels-
Capital Region Development Society)  and the Société Régionale d'In-
vestissement de Bruxelles  (SRIB, Brussels  Regional Investment Society) 
all work towards  the production of medium-sized dwellings. The struc-
ture could be simplified and the missions could be clarified by replacing 
these three organisms with a ‘Brussels  Economy’ agency, which would 
provide support for economic activity and integrate the information 
functions of the Entreprise Agency, as  well as with a  ‘Brussels Housing’ 
agency, which would ensure the supervision and financing of social 
8
22The police come under the jurisdiction of the federal authority. The comparison is pertinent nonetheless, to the extent that the management of the local police is handled by the 
municipalities.
23These are concrete examples, but a legal expert would question the orthodoxy of regional financing of sports infrastructures.
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housing companies, as  well as  the construction of medium-sized dwell-
ings for sale and/or for rent.
40. The mobility and parking policies come mostly under the Region, 
which has powers  of supervision and harmonisation, but which is per-
haps slow to exercise them. For example, the municipalities  devised 
municipal mobility plans before the adoption of the regional plan at the 
initiative of the Region, which subsidised them. Furthermore, three 
years after the adoption of the order of 22 January 2009 regarding the 
parking policy, one may question the effectiveness of the Parking 
Agency. In addition, the STIB  research division, the Bruxelles Mobilité 
strategy directorate and the Regional Parking Agency have very com-
plementary powers  but do not work together. A single body for pro-
gramming and for the study of regional mobility, bringing together all 
pertinent information and regional motivations  regardless  of the opera-
tor, would allow a more integrated approach.
3.2. Better intra-municipal collaborations
41. Municipal organisation could also be reconsidered in the perspec-
tive of more efficient management and better synergy with regional in-
stitutions  and operators. Let us  look at two examples related to man-
agement and housing.
42.  Municipal and CPAS services function in a very watertight manner. 
Do decision-making independence and the smooth functioning of the 
CPAS prevent it from sharing the same purchasing service, building 
management, computer system and management of the public hous-
ing stock with the municipality, or from having the same allocation rules 
and waiting lists, etc.?
43. The 33  SISP social housing companies, municipal administrations, 
CPAS administrations, municipal property management agencies, pri-
vate companies with municipal funding and AISs  all manage supervised 
rental housing stock: applicants  must put their names  down on differ-
ent waiting lists, which all have different allocation criteria. The reduction 
in the number of SISPs appears  in the institutional agreement of Sep-
tember 2011. It is intended to simplify the task of citizens  in search of 
housing, simplify management and reduce costs, strive towards  more 
coherent management of the housing policy and allow a  link between 
social housing policy and social policy, which are coordinated at local 
level by CPASs. No matter how ideal, this  merging project would 
probably encounter legal and financial difficulties.
3.3. A better synergy between Region and municipalities
44. The harmonious implementation of a power may require the inter-
vention of the Region (principle of subsidiarity), without justifying its  ap-
propriation in the light of the principle of proportionality. We therefore 
question the potential or underused synergies, in particular in terms of 
structures  and procedures  for dialogue or information exchange. The 
metropolis  of Lille is  often cited as  an example, based on a structured 
partnership between 'Lille metropolis' and the municipalities. It presents 
its  own institutional characteristics, but could inspire the Brussels 
project.24  The local specificities do not thwart the project on a larger 
scale when used as  inspiration and when the municipalities  situate their 
action in the framework of common objectives. In Lille, this  synergy of 
functions between the local authorities and the metropolis  takes  place 
through the development of places  for coordination, impetus  and in-
formation exchange. In Brussels, this  complementarity could involve 
other levels  of authority. Let us examine a few concrete examples  in 
order to understand the importance of developing these synergies, 
which already exist in certain domains.
3.3.1. The Region as coordinator and representative
45. The Local Authorities  Administration could become a true stake-
holder in the coordination between regional administrative structures, 
between the Region and the municipalities  and, finally, between mu-
nicipalities. The same coordination could be considered in terms of 
mobility, urbanism, harmonisation and management of municipal tech-
nical tools, and the harmonisation of municipal regulations. The munici-
palities  could adopt tax regulations  or a harmonised collection and 
claims system if the regional administration proposed a model.    
9
24 And, not to mention, it could possibly inspire the management of relations between the Brussels Region and its hinterland.
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46. At a time when much is said about the regionalisation of municipal 
powers, many of the administrative responsibilities  of the Region and 
the federal authority are being transferred to the municipalities  and the 
CPAS, without financial compensation. The Region could appeal to the 
federal authorities  for the responsibilities  imposed on the municipalities 
to comply with budget neutrality. 
3.3.2. The Region as an incentive and technical support
47. The Region and municipalities may be part of coherent policies, 
defined in cooperation or proposed by the Region. In this  case, the 
order sets  objectives  and offers  a financial advantage to the municipali-
ties  which participate in their realisation. The initiative regarding tax mat-
ters (order of 19 July 2007) could inspire others. There are many appli-
cations, from the coordination of trans-municipal cycle paths  to the 
development of public spaces. The method consists in combining mu-
nicipal self-government and a concern for coherence between munici-
pal and regional policies. Structural dialogue allows municipal action to 
'serve' more global regional objectives. This  is  particularly true in tax 
matters.25 Furthermore, this cooperation often proves  to be more effi-
cient than unilateral action. Coercive intervention in terms  of the har-
monisation of taxation and municipal charges would be subject to legal 
controversy and dispute. The concerted or incentive approach removes 
these difficulties  as  the municipalities  carry out modifications to appro-
priate regulations themselves.
48. The municipalities  sometimes  have services  at their disposal which 
are unjustified at this level of power, in particular considering the costs 
related to control, maintenance and use, as well as  their lack of useful-
ness in the daily management of the local authorities. Certain cases 
also require municipal services  with respect to powers  which are often 
beyond their expertise (debt management, elaboration of specifications, 
specialised translations, obtaining grants, etc.), for lack of regular use. 
The Region could centralise this expertise at a service point providing 
technical and logistical support to municipalities. This  form of subsidiar-
ity would combine rationalisation and economy of scale. 
3.4. Better inter-municipal collaborations
49. Inter-municipal collaboration raises questions  when it leads to a 
lack of democratic control or a variable level of power of administrators. 
Furthermore, reflection should be centred on the rationalisation of 
structures  and the reduction in their operating costs. Are the inter-
municipal water and energy distribution companies  still justified nowa-
days  in terms of municipal interest, considering the developments  in 
this  sector? Thus said, there are several beneficial forms of collabora-
tion, some of which do not involve inter-municipal structures, such as 
the management of the commercial area on Chaussée de Ninove 
(Atrium) by Molenbeek and Anderlecht, or the association of several 
municipalities  to manage a supra-municipal infrastructure such as a 
swimming pool.
Conclusion
50. How can Brussels ‘act like a big city’ - which involves more coher-
ence between the actions  of the different stakeholders  and more econ-
omy of scale - and go beyond the antagonism of municipalist or re-
gionalist visions? In terms of legal and institutional reflection, the princi-
ples  of subsidiarity and proportionality could steer this  evolution. In do-
ing so, it appears  to us  that although the principle of subsidiarity can 
justify regional intervention for many powers, the principle of propor-
tionality questions the option of their regionalisation pure and simple. 
51. The examples  presented are all possible areas  of work, and show 
that if we examine the possible options on a case-by-case basis, the 
effective implementation of regional powers and the improvement of 
dialogue procedures  between levels  of authority, each stakeholder is 
mobilised by enhancing the value of their assets in a cooperative ap-
proach. In particular, the Region could rely more on its  current powers 
to give coherence to municipal policies. The more frequent recourse to 
contractualisation favours  this  coherence, as  well as a dynamic of posi-
tive dialogue between levels of authority.
10
25On this point in particular, the long version of the analysis is made available by the author for download (in French only). 
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52. This, however, involves the implementation of a  true culture of 
evaluation, individual justification and negotiation of transfers or restric-
tions  of power between municipalities and the Region, in terms  of the 
process proposed by the Charter of Local Self-Government. Following 
this exercise and the fundamental revision of the organisation and 
methods of collaboration of the municipalities and the Region, an 
evaluation should be carried out with respect to a possible relationship 
of complementarity. The restricted length of this article does  not allow a 
discussion of the evolution of their respective roles  in the framework of 
all powers. Is  this  exercise bound to fail due to the 'municipalist' bias  of 
regional councillors  or the excessive influence of mayors, who under-
mine any vague desire for harmonisation? This remains to be seen. 
53. The institutional agreement of September 2011 is far from ending 
all reflection on the subject. Thankfully, because the residents  of Brus-
sels  themselves ought to be giving the issue some thought. The theme 
is  part of a wider debate and often serves  as  a bargaining chip: other 
dimensions therefore interfere and are sometimes  a long way from 
good governance. This shows the responsibility of authorised represen-
tatives  of Brussels who hold all the cards  to carry the debate on the 
organisation of powers between the Region and the municipalities 
through to a successful conclusion. It is  up to them to jump into the 
debate with realism and imagination, before others  attempt to take 
over. Is  this  not a very concrete way to defend the self-government and 
regional status of Brussels?
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